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Abstract 
This paper assesses the impact of New Public Management (NPM)-style reforms in 
European countries as perceived by top public sector officials. Using the COCOPS Top 
Executive Survey (20 European countries, N= 7,247), we look at the relationship 
between five key NPM reforms (downsizing, agencification, contracting out, customer 
orientation and flexible employment practices) and four dimensions of public sector 
performance: cost efficiency, service quality, policy coherence and coordination, and 
equal access to services. Structural equation modelling reveals that treating service users 
as customers and flexible employment are positively related to improvements on all four 
dimensions of performance. Contracting out and downsizing are both positively related 
to improved efficiency, but downsizing is also associated with worse service quality. 
The creation of autonomous agencies is unrelated to performance. This suggests that 
policy-makers seeking to modernise the public sector should prioritise managerial 
reforms within public organizations over large-scale structural transformations. 
 
Points for practitioners 
For practitioners, this paper provides an in-depth perspective on how top public sector 
executives perceive the impact of NPM-style public sector reforms on a number of 
performance dimensions. It allows them to better understand the relationship between 
reform strategies and outcomes in European administration, and allows them to compare 
their own experiences with those of top executives in other countries.  
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New Public Management Reforms in Europe and their Effects:  
Findings from a 20-Country Top Executive Survey 
 
Introduction  
New Public Management (NPM)-inspired reforms have dominated public sector 
agendas in Europe for most of the 1990s and 2000s, and still do in many countries even 
though new reform paradigms have emerged (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). Despite the 
enormous impact of NPM on governments in Europe, there is still comparatively little 
systematic research evidence of the effects of NPM reforms on the performance of the 
public sector within or across European countries. Most evaluations of NPM reforms 
tend to be impressionistic, or focused on limited aspects of these reforms and their 
outcomes (Pollitt and Dan, 2013). Moreover, scant research has drawn on large-scale 
data analysis to draw lessons about the effects of NPM across multiple countries.  
This paper adds valuable new data to debates about the impact of NPM by 
analysing top public sector officials’ perceptions of changes in public service 
performance in 20 European countries on four dimensions: cost efficiency, service 
quality, policy coherence and coordination, and equal access to services. These 
perceptions are related to five key NPM reforms: downsizing, agencification, 
contracting out, customer orientation and flexible employment practices. In this way, 
the paper seeks to sketch out a more comprehensive picture of the (perceived) successes 
and failures of NPM reforms than has previously been attempted. In addition, the 
connection between the different ‘intermediate’ dimensions of public service 
performance and the overall achievements of national governments is examined to 
provide further insights on what the administrative elite in Europe regards as the main 
drivers of high-performing public administration. 
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The paper first outlines current progress on evaluating public sector reform. We 
then address critical issues in evaluating NPM reforms, before going on to explore the 
potentially positive and negative effects of NPM reforms on the performance of public 
services. Subsequently, our unique dataset study of over 7,000 top public sector officials 
in 20 European countries is introduced and the analytical model is presented. 
Descriptive country-level findings are presented and the results from a structural 
equation model linking perceptions of NPM reforms with perceived performance 
improvements are discussed. The paper concludes by considering the implications for 
the theory and practice of public sector reform.  
 
Effects of public sector reform – an underdeveloped field of research 
Research on NPM has tended to look at changes in structures and processes, and most 
statements about outcomes have been generalisations about broad trends rather than 
empirically informed observations. This is perhaps inevitable, given the relatively far-
reaching yet sometimes ambiguous nature of NPM reforms (Van de Walle and 
Hammerschmid, 2011). Theoretically, NPM can be described quite elegantly using 
principal–agent and public choice frameworks (Grüning, 2001). In practice however, 
administrative reforms are invariably multifaceted, combine rhetoric and practice, suffer 
from incomplete specification, and experience shifts in purpose during the 
implementation process. In addition, reliable pre- and post-reform data are typically 
difficult to obtain, especially for far-reaching reform programmes. This makes 
evaluation difficult. 
In a recent meta-study of evaluations of NPM-style reforms in European 
countries, Pollitt and Dan (2011) found that ‘there is an ocean of studies of the 
application of NPM ideas within the Europe, but only a modest sea of works that offer 
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direct empirical analysis of outputs, and no more than a small pond that convincingly 
connect specific reforms to particular outcomes’ (Pollitt and Dan, 2011: 52). The 
evaluation of specific European NPM reforms is perhaps more straightforward because 
the characteristics of discrete reforms are more readily identified and disaggregated 
from wider programmes and trends (Pollitt, 2002; Andrews and Van de Walle, 2013: 
767). Indeed, drawing on OECD data, researchers have now begun to identify important 
cross-country variations in the extent and impact of key NPM reforms (e.g. Alonso et 
al.’s (2015) work on the effects of outsourcing on public sector size and employment). 
Nevertheless, important challenges remain in attempting to assemble datasets with 
which to carry out comparative evaluations of NPM.  
In Europe, where governments have implemented an array of different 
initiatives, reforms are often irreversible and as time passes it becomes increasingly 
difficult to design studies that can precisely establish their effects (Hansen et al., 2017). 
Moreover, only a limited set of indicators may be available for analysing the outcomes 
of NPM reforms. For example, several studies of agencification have identified the 
impact of this reform on internal processes and procedures, but, much less attention has 
been paid to its relationship with public service quality or equity (Dan, 2013).  
Research has often focused on a restricted range of outcomes. Cutting costs and 
improving efficiency has been the most important goal of NPM reforms in Europe 
(Hood, 2011), and many assessments of NPM have looked only at cost-effectiveness 
(see Andrews, 2010). There are fewer studies that simultaneously examine a range of 
outcomes. Boyne et al.’s (2003) evaluation of the relationship between reforms and 
public service responsiveness, equity and efficiency, and Andrews & Van de Walle’s 
(2013) study of NPM’s effects on efficiency, responsiveness, equity and effectiveness in 
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local government, are rare examples of scholarship dealing with multiple reforms and 
outcomes.  
Public management reforms inevitably encompass many paradoxes, trade-offs 
and dilemmas (Wollmann, 2003). It may be comparatively straightforward to draw on 
existing data sources to identify the impact of specific reforms within specific sectors 
(e.g. the privatisation and liberalisation of utilities, Clifton and Diaz-Fuentes, 2010). 
However, assessments of administrative change across the entire government apparatus 
require the mobilisation of an array of information on reforms and outcomes from 
different policy areas. One way in which such assessments can be undertaken is through 
the use of large-scale expert surveys. In this study, we draw upon survey data gathered 
from top public officials in 20 European countries who can give an expert opinion on 
the relative importance of different reforms within their policy area, and the 
performance of public services within their country.  
 
NPM reforms and public service performance 
NPM-style reforms were originally intended to make the public sector work better and 
cost less (Hood, 2011). With this emphasis on cost-cutting and efficiency came a greater 
focus on service users as customers, and attempts to loosen up restrictive employment 
practices. All of this was to be achieved through reforms intended to make the public 
sector more ‘business-like’ and give managers more ‘freedom to manage’ (Osborne and 
Gaebler, 1993). However, critics have focused on the potential for NPM to cause 
service provision to be unevenly distributed across different social groups (Harrow, 
2002). At the same time, the possibility that disaggregation and decentralisation can 
disrupt and fragment established lines of accountability has been highlighted (Webb, 
1991).  
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Debates about the costs and benefits of NPM reforms in Europe have persisted 
throughout the past three decades (see Christensen and Lægreid, 2010). The many 
promises of NPM require us to concentrate on various outcomes simultaneously. Our 
study therefore provides an empirical analysis of the relationship between multiple 
NPM reforms and multiple outcomes across European countries. In doing so, we focus 
on five key structural and managerial reforms that have been prominent within central 
governments across Europe: downsizing (i.e. reforms aimed at cutting costs, through 
redundancies, closures, terminations and so on); agencification (i.e. reforms that create 
quasi-autonomous agencies in place of government ministries): contracting out (i.e. 
reforms that put public services out to competitive tender): customer orientation (i.e. 
reforms that increase communication between public service providers and users) and 
flexible employment practices (i.e. reforms that make civil service careers less 
restrictive and hierarchically organized).  
 
Downsizing and performance 
Attempts to downsize government and to shrink the state by New Right political parties 
in the United Kingdom and the United States were the immediate precursors to the 
emergence of NPM in the 1980s (Hood, 1991). Key to nearly all NPM reforms in 
Europe has therefore been the assertion that bureaucracy is wasteful and inefficient and 
the counter-argument that a leaner, meaner government can be incentivised to seek out 
efficiency saving and quality-enhancing innovations (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993). 
Indeed, even theorists sympathetic to government have suggested that downsizing may 
be the mother of invention in the public sector (Kelman, 2006). Nevertheless, Hood and 
Dixon (2015) found that despite decades of structural reform within UK government, 
costs have gone up rather than down. 
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The cutback management literature highlights that optimistic accounts of the 
benefits of downsizing often confront uncomfortable organisational realities. In 
particular, where the slack resources needed to respond to environmental change are 
‘hollowed out’, service quality and equity declines (Raudla, Savi and Randma-Liiv, 
2015). Nevertheless, although the capacity to coordinate government activities may be 
substantially weakened by the loss of key personnel and expertise, expenditure cuts still 
seem prima facie likely to result in cost-savings. For this reason, we propose: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Downsizing will be positively related to efficiency improvements, but 
negatively related to other dimensions of performance. 
 
Agencification and performance 
Agencification entails the disaggregation of large government agencies into smaller 
quasi-autonomous units. This structural reform is intended to force bureaucratic 
organisations to be more amenable to the control of professional managers rather than 
politicians. By according agencies greater control over budgets, in particular, it is 
assumed that public managers will be motivated to search for cheaper and more 
innovative solutions to service delivery problems (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993). In many 
cases, this process of disaggregation involves the separation of the purchasing and 
providing functions within public organisations – a development intended to incentivise 
purchasing agents to drive production prices down (Hood, 1991). 
Increasing the pressure on managers by creating clearer lines of accountability 
through agencification is assumed to improve public administration overall, as well as 
save money. However, by hiving off certain functions from direct administrative control 
it is conceivable that organisational capability within government is weakened 
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(Andrews, Beynon and McDermott, 2016), and that these losses of capability may 
outweigh any potential efficiency gains. Indeed, a trend towards de-agencification and 
re-centralisation to address coordination problems has recently been observed within 
government (Elston, 2012). Hence, we advance: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Agencification will be positively related to efficiency improvements, but 
negatively related to other dimensions of performance.      
 
Contracting out and performance 
The conventional motivation for government to contract out services is the belief that 
this will cut costs. Public choice and property rights theories indicate that efficiency is 
enhanced when service production is transferred away from a public sector monopoly to 
a competitive market (Domberger and Jensen, 1997). Furthermore, private sector 
involvement in public service production is thought to result in service improvement 
because firm-specific innovations generate tangible benefits to the people responsible 
for their development (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994).  
The ‘quality-shading’ hypothesis (Hart, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) highlights 
that private contractors may be motivated to cut costs by reducing the quality of public 
services, especially for those provided to disadvantaged groups which are usually more 
complicated and expensive to deliver. These deteriorations in public service quality and 
equity can, in turn, can lead government to bring services back in-house (Hefetz and 
Warner, 2004). Nevertheless, the profit-maximization incentive for private contractors 
is still likely to generate cost-savings where services are contracted out. As a result, we 
suggest: 
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Hypothesis 3: Contracting out will be positively related to efficiency improvements, 
but negatively related to other dimensions of performance. 
 
Customer orientation and performance  
A key managerial reform associated with NPM in Europe is the move to encourage 
public servants and organisations to treat citizens as consumers (Aberbach and 
Christensen, 2005). Efforts to enhance the customer orientation of public organisations 
reflect NPM’s emphasis on the private sector’s responsiveness to market pressures 
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1993). Where citizens in general, and public service users in 
particular, are better informed, and better able to communicate with and influence the 
decisions of public service providers, those providers arguably direct and distribute their 
resources in a more efficient, equitable and coordinated way (Day and Klein, 1987). 
Critics suggest consumerist initiatives can lead service providers to favour 
wealthier citizens with the strongest voice, thereby undermining equal access to key 
services (Simmons, Powell, and Greener, 2009). Indeed, simultaneous pressure to 
marketise public services yet at the same safeguard access for vulnerable groups can be 
seen throughout most NPM reform debates (Van de Walle, 2008). Although evidence 
on the effects of consumerism is sparse, treating local public service users as customers 
has been found to actually enhance perceptions of how fairly different social groups are 
treated (Andrews and Van de Walle, 2013). Given its potential to transform all aspects 
of public service delivery, we therefore postulate: 
 
Hypothesis 4: The treatment of service users as customers will have a positive 
relationship with all dimensions of public service performance. 
 
   11 
Flexible employment and performance 
In many European countries, NPM reforms have focused on shifting the traditional 
career-based model of public employment towards a position-based one with more 
flexible employment conditions (Bach et al., 1999). Position-based personnel systems 
emphasise competitive entry, flexible working arrangements and performance-related 
rewards and progression (Van de Walle, Steijn and Jilke, 2015). Some observers have 
suggested civil servants in more position-based systems may be better qualified, and 
more motivated and skilled than those in more strongly career-based ones (Ketelaar, 
Manning and Turkisch, 2007). In this respect, flexible employment may be associated 
with improvements on all dimensions of public service performance. 
Employment flexibility is often associated with the loss of job security and 
tenure, and can have a detrimental effect on the morale of unskilled workers, decreasing 
their commitment to the organisation and increasing their intention to quit (Guest, 
2004). However, it can also provide skilled employees with boundaryless careers, 
through which they can design their own jobs (Guest, 2004). Since most public sector 
work is undertaken by skilled professionals, we posit: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Flexible employment practices will have a positive relationship with all 
dimensions of public service performance.  
 
Relationship between intermediate outcomes and overall performance 
Given the focus of NPM reforms on cost and efficiency improvements, it seems prima 
facie likely that reforms that deliver improvements on this performance dimension may 
have the strongest relationship with perceptions of the overall performance of public 
administration. However, it is also conceivable that reforms that are related to 
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improvements across multiple performance dimensions will be more important 
determinants of overall performance. Based on the arguments we develop above 
regarding the positive effects of managerial (e.g. consumerism) versus structural 
reforms (e.g. agencification), our final hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 6: Managerial reforms will have a stronger positive relationship with 
overall public administration performance than structural reforms 
 
Data and method 
Data come from a survey as part of one of the largest comparative public management 
research projects in Europe funded through the European Commission’s 7th framework 
program: COCOPS – Coordinating for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future 
(www.cocops.eu) (Hammerschmid et al., 2016). The survey targeted the entire 
population of top executives in central government ministries and agencies in 20 
European countries (Austria, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Serbia, Spain, Sweden and the UK). Unlike most other executive surveys in public 
administration, the COCOPS survey encompassed the first two hierarchical levels of 
executives as well as the third hierarchical level in most countries.  
Country teams translated the master questionnaire designed by an international 
team of academics and compiled the list of respondents following centrally designed 
instructions (Hammerschmid et al., 2013). The questionnaire was sent electronically 
through Unipark/Questback during 2012 and 2013, and was administered by a central 
team. In a number of countries, as a result of either inability to obtain direct email 
addresses of the top executives (e.g. France, Germany) or following low initial response 
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(e.g. the Netherlands), postal questionnaires were distributed. The dataset on which the 
paper is built consists of the 7,247 valid responses from these twenty countries, 
equivalent to an overall response rate of 27.4% (see Appendix). Although we cannot 
claim full representativeness for the survey data, the demographic characteristics of the 
sample of respondents is similar to that observed for the population of senior public 
managers in Europe (see OECD, 2013).  
Here we define central government as ministries (39% of our respondents) and 
agencies as well as subordinate government bodies at the central government level 
(55%). An exception was made for Spain and Germany – two highly decentralised 
countries – where we included state regional ministries (6%). Roughly one fifth (21%) 
of the respondents occupied the top hierarchical level within their organisation, with 
another 40% and 39% of questionnaires being completed by second and third level 
public officials. In terms of policy fields, most respondents were employed within 
general government (16%) with finance (12%), economic affairs (12%) and justice, 
public order and safety (12%) also well-represented. 
 
Dependent variables: perceived performance improvement 
Four intermediate performance outcomes, as perceived by respondents on a 1 
(deteriorated significantly) to 7 (improved significantly) scale, are used in the study. 
The exact survey questions were: ‘Thinking about your policy area over the last five 
years how would you rate the way public administration has performed on the following 
dimensions’: ‘cost and efficiency’, ‘service quality’, ‘policy coherence and 
coordination’, and ‘equal access to services’. The first item gauges how well resources 
are managed (i.e. the extent to which government pays a reasonable price for inputs and 
outputs). The second item captures how well public services are managed (i.e. the extent 
   14 
to which government outputs are of a high quality). The third item assesses the 
management of public policy (i.e. the quality of policy development and 
implementation). Finally, the fourth item evaluates the availability of services to 
disadvantaged social groups (i.e. the extent to which poor people can access the same 
public services as wealthy people). Prior research has found managers’ perceptions of 
performance to be valid, reliable and sensitive (Brewer, 2006). 
Table 1 shows the country-level perceptions of improvements on the four 
dimensions of performance. Across all countries, respondents are most positive about 
improvements in cost and efficiency and service quality. They are less positive about 
changes in policy cohesion and coordination and equal access to services. Danish and 
Irish executives are very positive about improvements in cost and efficiency, while 
Croatian and Lithuanian are much less so. French executives are negative about service 
quality whereas Austrian, Norwegian and Dutch executives are positive. Danish, Dutch 
and Irish executives see clear improvements in coordination, whereas Austrian 
executives are negative about this. Finally, French and Italian executives are less 
positive about equal access to services, whereas Central European executives in Estonia, 
Lithuania and Hungary are positive about this performance dimension.  
 
[Table 1] 
 
Respondents were also asked about their perception of the overall performance of public 
administration in their country. The wording of this item and the answer scale matched 
an EU-wide Eurobarometer survey (Special EB 370) in which the same question was 
asked to citizens. Specifically, the respondents were asked to rate on a scale of 1 
(Worse) to 10 (Better): “Compared with five years ago, how would you say things have 
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developed when it comes to the way public administration runs in your country?” This 
subjective self-report is intended to capture top executives’ perception of how well the 
public sector is managed as a whole under the rubric of a single measure. Hence, it 
brings in intermediate dimensions of performance that we did not measure, such as 
organizational capacity and capability, alongside those that we do, to construct a 
measure akin to the overall quality of government.  
 Figure 1 presents means and standard deviations for the measure of overall 
performance across the entire sample. It shows that executives are most positive in 
Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, and Sweden; though the mean score is above seven 
out of ten in just one of these countries. In Spain, Croatia and Portugal, executives 
indicate that overall public administration performance has deteriorated.  
 
[Figure 1] 
 
Independent variables 
The presence of NPM reforms was operationalised by asking respondents to indicate on 
a 7-point scale (1 = not at all to 7 = to a large extent) the importance of the following 
reforms in their own policy area: public sector downsizing (e.g. the ‘Révision Générale 
des Politiques Publiques’ programme in France), creation of autonomous agencies or 
corporatisation (e.g. the ‘Spain Law of State Agencies’), contracting out (e.g. the Work 
Programme in the UK), treatment of service users as customers (e.g. the Open 
Government Partnership initiative), and flexible employment (e.g. the Reform of the 
Civil Service Law in Germany). Using the views of public officials to evaluate reforms 
is common practice (see e.g. Brewer, 2006; Emery and Giauque, 2003).  
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Figure 2 presents how top public executives rate the importance of NPM reforms 
in their policy area, across all countries. Treating service users as customers is the most 
important reform, followed by downsizing. Contracting out and the creation of 
autonomous agencies are rated as substantially less important, and even as unimportant. 
One likely explanation is that these reforms mainly happened in the past.  
 
[Figure 2] 
 
There are important differences across countries not reported in the figure. Respondents 
in Ireland, Estonia, and the UK identify downsizing as an important trend, in contrast 
with Norway. The creation of autonomous agencies is not seen as a trend in countries 
such as Sweden, Finland or Lithuania. It is however important in Estonia, France and 
the Netherlands. Contracting out is an important trend in the UK, the Netherlands and 
Ireland, but hardly so in Hungary. Treating users as customers is very important in 
Finland and Portugal, but not in France. Finally, flexible employment is salient in 
Estonia and Finland, but not in France or Hungary. 
 
Controls 
Because NPM reforms have been unevenly distributed across policy fields, 
dichotomous variables controlling for policy area are added as controls in the structural 
equation modelling. Country controls were added to the second part of the model. We 
performed a further robustness check by controlling for country-policy field cross-
products (i.e. 216 country-policy field dummies), which made no difference to our 
results. 
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Respondents are treated as expert witnesses on developments in their own policy 
area and organisation, and it is not our intention to explain individual-level variation. 
For this reason, controls for the respondents’ age, gender, tenure, position or educational 
background were not added. 
  
Structural Equation Model 
A structural equation modelling process was undertaken, which simultaneously relates 
the perceived importance of NPM reforms to the four different performance dimensions, 
and the relationships between these dimensions of performance and the overall 
evaluation of public administration. While our model does not include latent factors, we 
are able to estimate the implied total effects of reform trends on overall public 
administration performance as well as the overall model fit. Figure 3 outlines our SEM 
model.  
 
[Figure 3] 
 
The overall measurement fit for the model is good: the comparative fit index 
(CFI) is 0.998, the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) is 0.977 and the root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA) is 0.026. Since all the study variables were measured using 
data from the same respondents, which may generate common method bias (CMB), a 
number of ex ante and post hoc measures were taken (Chang et al, 2010). Ex ante, CMB 
was minimised by positioning the items on NPM reforms and perceived effects in 
different parts of the questionnaire. Post hoc, the Harman single factor test offers no 
evidence for CMB. A model in which all the indicators were loaded onto a single factor 
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had a poor fit (CFI=0.808, TLI=0.698, RMSEA=0.093). Furthermore, the correlations 
between the NPM reform variables and the outcome variables are all below .25. 
 
Analysis 
The results are shown in Tables 2 and 3. Policy field and country control estimates were 
suppressed. The results presented in Panel 1 in Table 2 show the relationship between 
downsizing, agencification, contracting out, customer orientation and flexible 
employment practices and cost efficiency, service quality, policy coherence and 
coordination, and equal access to services. The results in Panel 2 then indicate the 
association between respondents’ perceptions of these intermediate outcomes and 
perceived overall improvements in public administration.  
 
[Table 2] 
 
Large-scale structural NPM reforms, such as public sector downsizing, 
contracting out or the creation of autonomous agencies are mostly unrelated to 
performance. Nevertheless, the coefficients for downsizing and contracting out are both 
positive and statistically significant for the paths predicting cost and efficiency; results 
which comport with hypotheses 1 and 3 and the conventional theoretical and policy 
arguments in favour of these reforms. The coefficient for downsizing is negative and 
also statistically significant for the path predicting service quality (as per hypothesis 1), 
while the coefficient for contracting out is positive and statistically significant for the 
path predicting policy coordination. Interestingly, the coefficient for agencification is 
positive but not statistically significant for the path predicting policy co-ordination. 
Hence, our second hypothesis is neither confirmed or disconfirmed. 
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In contrast to the structural NPM reforms, treating citizens as customers and 
flexible employment are associated with improved performance across the board: the 
coefficients for both reforms are consistently positive and statistically significant. These 
results provide confirmation of our fourth and fifth hypotheses. Further analysis 
highlights that the intermediate outcomes all have a significant positive effect on 
perceptions of overall improvements in the way public administration runs the country. 
This indicates, in line with our sixth hypothesis, that reforms which generate 
improvements across multiple performance dimensions are likely to have the greatest 
overall impact on how public administration is perceived. Indeed, the results presented 
in Table 3 confirm that the treatment of service users as customers is a critical 
determinant of public service improvement across Europe: the coefficient for this 
reform is a positive and statistically significant predictor of overall performance. While 
there is some evidence of a negative relationship between downsizing and overall 
performance and a positive connection between agencification and performance, the 
coefficients for these reforms only achieve statistical significance at p.<0.1, so should 
be treated with great caution. 
 
[Table 3] 
 
Discussion 
This paper draws on a unique large scale survey of top public sector executives in 20 
European countries to illustrate the effects of NPM-style public sector reforms. Findings 
show that major ‘structural’ NPM reforms, such as downsizing and contracting out, are 
associated with improved efficiency, but otherwise barely influence perceptions of 
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performance improvement – downsizing is also associated with worse service quality, 
and, somewhat surprisingly, contracting out exhibits a positive relationship with policy 
co-ordination. By contrast, ‘managerial’ reforms, such as treating service users as 
customers and flexible employment practices have significant positive effects on the 
four intermediate performance dimensions we study. A customer orientation, in 
particular, has a strong connection with service quality and policy coordination, and on 
overall public administration performance. More generally, treating service users as 
customers appears to be a major determinant of overall performance.  
It is of course striking that downsizing and contracting out, reforms commonly 
associated with NPM, have a positive relationship with costs and efficiency. Thus, 
while the existing evidence on efficiency-gains from these reforms is still mixed (e.g. 
Bel, Fageda and Warner, 2010; Hood and Dixon, 2015), our findings suggest senior 
public managers believe in their efficacy as tools for saving money. This finding 
provides support for arguments in favour of such reforms advanced by supporters of 
NPM (see Osborne and Gaebler, 1993). Nevertheless, as the ‘quality-shading 
hypothesis’ suggests (Hart, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), efficiency improvements may 
come at a price. European central governments pursuing a downsizing strategy appear 
to experience a drop-off in public service quality – a result that also accords with 
theories of cutback management (see Raudla, Savi and Randma-Liv, 2015). The 
positive connection between contracting out and policy co-ordination may suggest that 
contractors’ managerial capabilities are an additional source of government capacity 
(Brown and Potoski, 2006). More generally though, whatever the gains in efficiency, an 
emphasis on structural reforms (downsizing, agencification, contracting out), does not 
appear to be bringing the many other performance benefits that advocates of NPM 
reforms assert  
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One possible explanation for the findings for structural NPM reforms is that they 
have not been introduced to achieve long term improvements in service quality, policy 
co-ordination and equality of access. Rather, they have been implemented to cope with 
short-term demands for cutbacks and cost-savings in the wake of the global financial 
crisis (Randma-Liiv and Kickert, 2017). Our survey questions pertain to the height of 
the crisis (2008-12), which may have changed the dynamic of the relationship between 
reforms and their outcomes. Future studies in times of fiscal plenty would cast valuable 
light on whether structural NPM reforms can potentially achieve the wider performance 
objectives with which they are often tasked. 
The extent to which service users are treated as customers is the NPM reform 
with the strongest overall effect on performance. This finding confirms the insights 
from theorists of public sector consumerism regarding the benefits of a more 
personalised, individualised style of public service (Day and Klein, 1989; Le Grand, 
2006). Inculcating a customer focus among public servants may be one of the first and 
easiest steps towards wider reform, and could have a symbolic effect on perceptions of 
administrative competence and effectiveness. Indeed, treating service users as 
customers generally requires few major structural changes, but is often reflected in a 
wider cultural change signalling that public sector organisations have become more 
citizen-centred as much as consumer-orientated (Aberbach and Christensen, 2005). 
Hence, our findings on consumer orientation add further weight to the evidence on its 
benefits that is slowly emerging (e.g. Andrews and Van de Walle, 2013). 
In addition to the positive effects of a customer focus, the introduction of 
flexible forms of employment appears to be a reliable strategy for public sector 
improvement. This finding may also be the result of positive cultural change within 
public organisations, with employment flexibility often associated with the ’can-do’ 
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attitude that underpins position-based personnel systems (Van de Walle, Steijn and 
Jilke, 2015). Our findings therefore affirm the arguments in favour of such personnel 
systems that have long been advanced by policy-makers (Ketelaar, Manning and 
Turkisch, 2007). Indeed, governments that are able to experiment with flexible 
employment may already have achieved the overhaul of traditional bureaucratic 
processes deemed necessary to make government more responsive to societal needs and 
demands (Osborne and Gaebler, 1993). 
 
Study limitations 
The study has a number of shortcomings that can form the basis for subsequent 
research. First, our findings pertain solely to the effects of NPM in European countries. 
NPM has not been so popular in other parts of the world (Manning, 2001), so it would 
be important to investigate the extent to which our findings are replicated in 
environments less receptive to NPM-style ideas, especially developing countries across 
Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Second, due to data limitations we are unable to tease 
out which flexible employment practices are responsible for our results. Further 
quantitative and qualitative research addressing this issue would cast invaluable light on 
the personnel reforms needed to achieve public service performance improvements. 
Third, the cross-sectional nature of the data means we are unable to offer firm 
conclusions regarding causal relationships. Studies that draw upon longitudinal or 
experimental data could seek to address the issue of causation. Fourth, the measures 
used to capture NPM reforms are self-reports. These reports were provided by key 
experts responsible for the development of public sector reforms, but may reflect 
idiosyncratic personal perspectives. Future work drawing upon administrative data 
could potentially circumvent issues of faulty recall and social desirability bias. Fifth, 
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while common method bias is not a serious threat to our findings, research designs 
utilising administrative measures of performance would be extremely illuminating. 
Finally, to lower the response burden and increase the response rate we relied on single-
item measures for all of our constructs. Subsequent studies could utilise multi-item 
scales to estimate a measurement model capturing the full complexity of specific NPM 
reforms. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper highlights that top public officials in Europe associate NPM reforms with 
improved public sector efficiency. However, only the treatment of service users as 
customers and flexible employment practices are associated with improvements on 
service quality, policy co-ordination and equal access to services as well. Furthermore, 
the treatment of service users as customers alone is strongly related to improved public 
administration performance overall. This suggests that policy-makers seeking to 
modernise the public sector should prioritise managerial reforms within public 
organizations over large-scale structural transformations. 
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Table 1. Perceived 5-year change in intermediate outcomes (means) 
Country 
Cost and 
efficiency Service quality 
Policy 
coherence and 
coordination 
Equal access to 
services 
Austria 4.74 5.09 3.56 4.30 
Croatia 3.96 4.32 3.83 4.50 
Denmark 5.35 4.68 4.51 4.38 
Estonia 4.64 4.94 4.04 4.85 
Finland 4.85 4.81 4.13 4.67 
France 4.48 3.90 3.79 3.98 
Germany 4.83 4.90 3.76 4.37 
Hungary 4.58 4.59 4.33 4.75 
Iceland 4.73 4.57 4.34 4.59 
Ireland 5.24 4.85 4.47 4.51 
Italy 4.70 4.53 3.89 4.18 
Lithuania 4.08 4.83 3.93 4.95 
Norway 4.76 5.06 4.30 4.73 
Poland 4.17 4.69 3.91 4.52 
Portugal 4.66 4.95 3.77 4.78 
Serbia 4.28 4.82 4.06 4.39 
Spain 4.22 4.47 3.90 4.62 
Sweden 4.91 4.90 3.72 4.22 
The Netherlands 5.15 5.01 4.53 4.46 
UK 5.11 4.60 4.34 4.36 
All countries 4.68 4.73 4.06 4.50 
Scale: 1 = deteriorated significantly to 7 = improved significantly; total score based on 
equal country weights 
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Table 2. SEM estimation results  
Panel 1: Reform trends to outcomes Estimate sig. 
Cost and efficiency   
Public sector downsizing 0.057 <0.001 
Creation of autonomous agencies or corporatisation -0.015 0.296 
Contracting out 0.032 <0.05 
Treatment of service users as customers 0.114 <0.001 
Flexible employment 0.074 <0.001 
Service quality 
  Public sector downsizing -0.031 <0.05 
Creation of autonomous agencies or corporatisation -0.014 0.296 
Contracting out 0.009 0.358 
Treatment of service users as customers 0.206 <0.001 
Flexible employment 0.084 <0.001 
Policy coherence and coordination 
  Public sector downsizing 0.002 0.851 
Creation of autonomous agencies or corporatisation 0.011 0.406 
Contracting out 0.028 <0.05 
Treatment of service users as customers 0.083 <0.001 
Flexible employment 0.062 <0.001 
Equal access to services 
  Public sector downsizing -0.004 0.778 
Creation of autonomous agencies or corporatisation -0.011 0.396 
Contracting out -0.012 0.387 
Treatment of service users as customers 0.213 <0.001 
Flexible employment 0.060 <0.001 
Panel 2: Outcomes to overall improvement perceptions   
Cost and efficiency 0.095 <0.001 
Service quality 0.221 <0.001 
Policy coherence and coordination  0.210 <0.001 
Equal access to services 0.078 <0.001 
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Table 3. Total effects: reform trends to overall perceptions of improvement 
 
Estimate sig. 
Public sector downsizing -0.022 <0.10 
Creation of autonomous agencies or corporatisation 0.022 <0.10 
Contracting out 0.009 0.478 
Treatment of service users as customers 0.049 <0.001 
Flexible employment 0.009 0.432 
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Figure 1. Perceived 5-year change in public administration performance  
 
Scale: 1=worse to 10 = better; mean and std  
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Figure 2. Importance of NPM reform trends in 20 countries  
 
Scale: 1= not at all to 7=to a large extent; score based on equal country weights 
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Figure 3. Model relating reform trends to perceived outcomes 
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Appendix 
Table 1A. Survey sample 
Country Invitations Responses Share 
Response 
rate  
Austria  1,407 493 6.8% 35.0% 
Croatia 650 176 2.4% 27.1% 
Denmark 758 147 2.0% 19.4% 
Estonia 913 318 4.4% 34.8% 
Finland 1,742 703 9.7% 40.4% 
France 3,403 587 8.1% 17.2% 
Germany * 1,955 445 6.1% 22.8% 
Hungary 924 250 3.4% 27.1% 
Iceland 392 200 2.8% 51.0% 
Ireland 980 375 5.2% 38.3% 
Italy 971 172 2.4% 17.7% 
Lithuania 1,098 432 6.0% 39.3% 
Norway 1,197 334 4.6% 27.9% 
Poland 1390 170 2.3% 12.2% 
Portugal 1,038 296 4.1% 28.5% 
Serbia 1,644 880 12.1% 53.5% 
Spain ** 1,684 297 4.1% 17.6% 
Sweden 1,293 523 7.3% 40.4% 
The Netherlands 670 196 2.7% 29.3% 
UK 2,325 253 3.5% 10.9% 
Total 26,434 7,247  27.4% 
* includes ministries (but not agencies) at state government level 
** includes  ministries (but not agencies) at regional government level 
 
 
